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As the ice to the north recedes, the Arctic Ocean expands, leaving hundreds of square 
miles of open ocean surrounding the North Pole, laden with highly profitable resources. Because 
of the effects of climate change, the Arctic’s vast amount of untapped resources is beckoning to 
be plundered, and each arctic nation is competing for the rights to exploit them. However, the 
legal regime of the Arctic Ocean, the United Nations Convention for the Law of the Sea is not 
specific enough for application to a polar ocean. There are many overlapping economic zones in 
newly available areas which are becoming contested by the arctic nations, and with continued ice 
recession will only get worse. To resolve some of these disputes, the countries whose territories 
extend into the Arctic Circle (The United States, Canada, Denmark, Norway, Finland, Sweden, 
Iceland and Russia), participate in the Arctic Council System, an intergovernmental forum 
designed to promote cooperation between the nations within the Arctic Circle. The Arctic 
Council Service, founded in 1996, is currently the only mutually agreed upon institution 
presiding over all eight nations surrounding the pole; and it is drastically underequipped to 
preserve the political harmony of the Arctic as the effects of climate change become more 
severe.  As the polar ice recedes and the Arctic Ocean opens, it is crucial that the Arctic Council 
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be given the legal authority within the arctic community to prevent serious international conflicts 
and promote inter-governmental cooperation. 
Though it remained largely unexplored until the 19th Century, the Arctic Circle has long 
been a valuable territory for the nations that claim it as their northernmost border. At one time, 
one of the world’s largest companies, The Hudson’s Bay Company, had controlling interest in a 
vast portion of Arctic territory. This company not only collected furs and other North American 
goods, but they also aided in the exploration of the Arctic coastline, primarily because of the 
lucrative fur business. The Hudson’s Bay Company solely funded many of the earliest European 
expeditions into the arctic. “They knew that in exploration half-hearted and inefficient co-
operation leads inevitably to disaster, and in subsequent expeditions they gave valuable and 
effective aid (to arctic explorations)” (Mirsky 123). It was these explorations that founded the 
interest in the Arctic as an economic hub.  
Prior to the modern era, the Arctic was generally avoided; it was the unused territory in 
the northern extremes of the countries that topped the globe. Up until the latter half of the 19th 
century, countries such as Canada and Russia laid claims to all territories leading to the North 
Pole.1 As mapping improved, each country eventually staked its own claim to the land above the 
sixtieth parallel. At the beginning of the twentieth century, when the application of fossil fuels 
seized the international market, the Arctic was not yet considered; only when the ice started 
melting did many countries realize that they could move offshore to search for fossil fuels in a 
completely untapped region.2 Today, the Arctic continues to be sought after for many other 
economic reasons, however oil is still the most sought after, moving many international 
companies into the Arctic speculating over the vast amounts of oil resting on the seafloor.3 
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Certainly, the promise of finding oil on the seafloor is a tantalizing reason to reconsider 
the value of territory in the Arctic Ocean.4 Within Russian territories alone, it is possible to 
extract up to ten million barrels of oil per day (Lajunesse). Russia recognizes this, having spent 
billions of dollars on resource expeditions to find the oil here.5  With conservatively priced oil, 
that is, in a competitive market without inflated prices, Russia stands to make tens to hundreds of 
millions of dollars on oil daily. This new interest in oil exploration within the Arctic Circle has 
been a very recent motivator for arctic countries, only having become a huge factor within the 
last two decades. The Arctic oil industry cannot be ignored as the global demand for carbon-
based fuels increases; “The world simply needs hydrocarbons too much, and the remaining 
prospects are few” (Nelder).  
A large cause of the renaissance for oil exploration in the north comes from ice melt, 
which on average, the Arctic is expected to lose “74,000 square kilometers worth of ice each 
year—adding up to a loss of over two million square kilometers since the late 1970s” 
(Lajunesse).6 Receding sea ice is ultimately the primary cause of the political stress in the region. 
The sea ice is what made the Arctic so perilous, often dooming ships who drifted too far north 
which made the Arctic nearly unnavigable. This made the Arctic Ocean devoid of political 
importance, having no international traffic. The continued recession of sea ice however will 
make more of the ocean more accessible, and more desirable for the arctic nations; requiring 
political action where none has existed before.  
The recession of polar sea ice not only exposes the Arctic for the mining of fossil fuels, 
but also for more months of safe passage within the previously treacherous arctic waters. The 
most important waterway in the Arctic Circle is the Northwest Passage, which stretches from 
Newfoundland, between Greenland and the Canadian Maritimes and along the North American 
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coastline to the Bering Strait.7 This Passage is a shorter distance to Asia for many European 
countries than the Panama Canal. There have been “centuries of exploration aimed to join 
Europe and Asia” (Kraska), and the Northwest Passage is geographically speaking the shortest 
route, the downside being it was almost always frozen shut and treacherous for most ships.8 
“Compared to the current routes via the Panama Canal and Suez Canal, a transit from the Pacific 
to the Atlantic through the Northwest Passage could save two weeks of travel”. Such advantages 
represent a great significance for global trade, which could benefit greatly from faster sea travel. 
With the melting of sea ice, this waterway becomes a more useful resource for international 
shipping in a world where “90 percent of world trade is carried by sea” (Parkey). The Northwest 
Passage remains under the jurisdiction of Canada, Denmark, the United States and Russia. And 
because of this, these countries must be cooperative in order for this particular oceanic lane to be 
viable and efficient; disagreement between any of these countries could close off the passage. 
Mediating these four countries and their interactions with a potential international shipping 
highway would require a large degree of high-level international cooperation, to guarantee safe 
passage for ships from all around the world.9 
With increasing Arctic sea traffic, the arctic coastline would undoubtedly become more 
vulnerable to spying or foreign attacks in a barely developed area. This may lead the Arctic 
states to be much more defensive with concerns to permitting international access to the waters 
offshore. The Arctic Ocean is the shortest distance between many of the countries of the Arctic, 
and each country has its own resources and strategic establishments to defend. Previously, the 
geographic separation of these countries was largely maintained by sea ice, which effectively 
sealed off the borders between the months of September and June. This helped to keep enemies 
out, leaving an entire border naturally defended. Now with increased maritime activity and 
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greatly reduced amount of sea ice, comes the potential of new threats to the security of a country 
(Kraska). This is creating new oceanic borders, transforming the Arctic Ocean an eight-way free-
for-all in less than thirty years. Because the territorial lines are so amorphous, who delineates the 
arctic territories is becoming neigh-arbitrary. And for many arctic countries, the fact that the 
Arctic is becoming highly traveled and mined for resources is demanding political change at an 
uncomfortable pace; from stagnant to agenda-topping within the course of a few decades. The 
Arctic is changing, and the arctic states are merely drawing lines in the sand over who controls 
what, a definition which is constantly changing. 
The definitions of the effective range of the arctic states is currently drawn from the 
application of the Law of the Sea, especially regarding the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). 
According to the Law of the Sea, nations only have control up to twelve nautical miles from their 
shores, with EEZs up to 200 miles offshore (Preamble).10 The EEZ of a country is specifically 
designated for the sole economic use of that country; other countries utilizing this area without 
the knowledge or consent of the primary country is grounds for punishment from that country.11 
The EEZ is the most important factor when determining the boundary lines within the Arctic 
Ocean, and implementing the EEZ is very difficult when considering proximity to the pole, as 
200 miles north of any nearly any point in the Arctic Circle is likely to overlap with another 
country’s EEZ. Currently, the EEZ is the largest international debacle in the Arctic Ocean, but 
soon this may not be entirely true. “Those rules (of the exclusive economic zone) mainly concern 
the Arctic coastal states. However, if the Arctic Ocean, because of climate change, becomes 
navigable part of the year, then the high seas regime in UNCLOS comes into play” (Corell). The 
Arctic Ocean is politically unique being governed primarily by coastal laws under the Law of the 
Sea, despite being large enough to require laws of the high seas.  
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 The Arctic Ocean, like other unique bodies of water like the Mediterranean or Black sea, 
are listed as exceptions because it is enclosed. Article 123 of the Convention on the Law of the 
Sea, titled “Enclosed or Semi-Enclosed Seas” is one of the exceptions applicable to the Arctic 
Ocean.12 Article 123 explains that the Law of the Sea is not entirely valid in these enclosed seas, 
and thus requires that management of the international waters be deferred to the countries 
surrounding that body of water.13 The fact that the Arctic Ocean is enclosed makes the primary 
concern for arctic waters the EEZ, is difficult to determine, creating “an international law 
vacuum in the Arctic” (Molenaar). Other enclosed seas draw these lines through inter-
governmental agreements between the governments of countries that share that area of water. 
The Arctic Ocean however is considered to be too large under the current definitions of the Law 
of the Sea to require the application of Article 123.  
The Enclosed Sea Exception is not the only exception of the Law of the Sea that causes 
problems. Article 234 of the Law of the Sea, which allows for the most proximate nation that 
controls territory near vulnerable sections of the ocean to deny access to those waters to better 
protect the environment and the sailors who may move into the area.14 This exception allows 
Canada and Russia almost complete control over polar sea routes (despite territorial 
delineations), because they control most of the Arctic Ocean’s coastline. The United States, 
however, believes “that polar sea routes, on both the Canadian and Russian side of the ocean, 
were international straits, subject to broad navigational rights for foreign ships” (Bartenstein). 
The understanding of Canada and Russia, through the Law of the Sea, is that it gives them 
complete discretion over the movement near their territorial waters. For them, it is logical for the 
protection of the lives of sailors and the environment alike. The United States however is 
adamant that this provision under the Law of the Sea further blurs the line between international 
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and territorial waters.15 Disagreements over territory, particularly what is international, is a 
debate with no middle-ground and it must be resolved as the recession of sea ice redefines the 
responsibilities of the Arctic States. 
The Law of the Sea and all of its discrepancies was the only international framework that 
held any weight in the Arctic Ocean until 1996. As the result of an initiative to preserve the 
Arctic ecosystem, the 1996 Ottawa Declaration set up the Arctic Council System to promote 
cooperation between the eight arctic nations.16 To keep the forum peaceful, The Arctic Council 
defers all authority to the Law of the Sea and the UN’s framework. The Arctic Council is the 
only inter-governmental institution solely intended for the regulation of the Arctic. This 
organization is a high level forum that serves to promote cooperation, coordination and 
interaction among the Arctic States, as well as to provide sustainable development for Arctic 
States and to promote interest in Arctic related issues (Declaration).17 The goals of the Arctic 
Council are mutualistic by nature, striving for the sustainability of an economy and the 
preservation of the arctic environment, while simultaneously protecting the interests of the 
individual arctic states.18 The Arctic Council meets on a bi-annual basis, where the 
representatives from the member nations discuss changes in policy and advancements regarding 
the territory.19 Initially, this system was designed to protect the ecosystem and the lands of the 
indigenous groups who live within the Arctic Circle, but due to the increasing significance of the 
icecap, it has become increasingly a vessel for negotiating major international concerns between 
the Arctic States. 
Now, the sole organization specifically tasked with mediating the Arctic is being placed 
under pressure, as the now apparent effects of climate change drastically increase the political 
and economic significance of the Arctic Ocean. Estimates suggest that if annual ice recession 
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continues, there could be a completely ice-free Arctic summer as early as 2050 (Wanerman). An 
ice-free Arctic not only represents a huge opportunity for open ocean shipping along the northern 
sea route but also the liberation of enough space to establish large-scale resource extraction 
operations in this area.20 Because of this opportunity, many major world powers would gladly 
seize the opportunity to monopolize the vast untapped resources in an area officially designated 
as “international waters” by the Law of the Sea. This is no exception for the circumpolar states, 
who are only hindered by other polar nations expanding into the same area as they are. Because 
every country in the Arctic’s territories are so closely positioned and fiercely debated with those 
of another country, the Arctic Council cannot effectively represent each independently because 
its definitions are taken the Law of the Sea and the United Nations. 
The Law of the Sea has numerous intricacies that create a scope that is far too broad for a 
reasonable application to the Arctic Ocean.21 In order for countries to be disciplined in any way 
by the United Nations for infractions of the Law of the Sea, that country must have first ratified 
the Law of the Sea.22 An appeal to a commission of the United Nations then amends the issue, 
but only within the effective powers of the United Nations. As of now, only seven of the eight 
circumpolar states have ratified the Law of the Sea; all minus the United States (Gunitskiy). The 
United States’ failure to recognize the Law of the Sea creates many problems, especially inter-
governmental problems that arise due to differences in the definition of what constitutes 
international waters. This disagreement is one of the reasons Canada is so particular with regards 
to the Northwest Passage, which the United States believes is not under the jurisdiction of 
Canada. Because there are no universally agreed upon definitions of arctic law, cooperation in all 
aspects of arctic politics is made more difficult.  
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Despite the inadequacy of the Law of the Sea, the Arctic Council Service as it stands 
today, is not a strictly better alternative. This is because the Arctic Council Service is required by 
its charter to refrain from all military based concerns; an unavoidable element of the arctic 
political environment.23 The 1996 Ottawa Declaration dictates that: “The Arctic Council should 
not deal with matters related to military security” (Declaration), this is a particular mandate was 
designed to promote peaceful cooperation for the mutual protection of the Arctic as a culturally 
and ecologically distinct region. As the arctic climate causes geographic changes and the 
individual governments of the arctic states expand towards the North Pole, it is to be expected 
that in defense of their interests, that their militaries will become involved. The fact that “the 
Arctic Council does not impose legally binding obligations on any of its participants” (Corell), 
will only be further challenged when major countries decide that self-interested exploitation of 
the Arctic is more important than the mutual interest for arctic preservation.24 Without 
international power, the Arctic Council can be nothing more than a silent objector to the abuse of 
the arctic environment and its mandates for peace would be made inconsequential.25  
The weaknesses of the Arctic Council cause a lack of agreement in the arctic, which is 
another cause of political stress. This is worsened by the fact that the United Nations, rather than 
the Arctic Council, is tasked with intervening when disputes get too serious. The process to have 
the United Nations intervene may be tragically slow, and potentially ineffective. At most, the 
commission appointed by the United Nations “only has a mandate to review the evidence and 
make recommendations, not enforce decisions” (Gunitskiy). As far as the enforcement of the 
United Nations goes, the Arctic Ocean may as well be lawless. The Arctic Council could easily 
assume the role fulfilled by the United Nations as part of its existing mandates for promoting 
international cooperation, but only when given the proper authority.  
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The arctic states are not the only institutions vying for position in the Arctic. Many 
globalized companies have a great amount of interest in the arctic, especially the commercial 
fishing industry. The Arctic “already supports four of the ten largest world fisheries, and there is 
likely room for further growth” (Kakabadse).26 One of the principles of the Arctic Council is to 
promote sustainable development; with the economic viability of the Arctic Ocean improving 
with every mile of sea-ice melted, the need for sustainability also grows. Without an 
authoritative voice, there is no guarantee that any of the member states of the Arctic Council will 
not violate this directive.  
In an attempt to mitigate the control over the arctic oil industry, Europe and the United 
States have put forth sanctions attempting to limit Russian control over the oil market, the 
majority of which comes from arctic oil expeditions. These policies specifically target Russian 
claims to oil reserves within the Arctic Ocean and the major companies extracting oil there. 
“Russia’s existing fields continue to pump 1 of every 8 barrels produced worldwide each day—
an output valued at $425 billion a year, about one-fifth of the country’s gross domestic product” 
(Carroll). With twenty percent or more of a country’s gross domestic product reliant or resources 
strictly from the Arctic, it is clear that Russia has no intentions to cease expanding out into the 
arctic with the potential profit observed in the area. “Russian demand for hydrocarbons is also 
fueled by its influence in the European market, which represents large amount of its foreign 
power. The dependence of key European states on Russian oil and gas supplies gives Moscow a 
potent foreign policy instrument to exert influence” (Roi).27 Clearly, Russia is exploiting its 
arctic territory to the fullest extent, exerting it over the European oil market. This region is 
proving to be very valuable for the arctic states, and international prohibitions on other arctic 
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goods can only inhibit the Arctic economy, providing forum and promoting cooperation on the 
behalf of the Arctic Council may help to mitigate the competitiveness of the arctic oil. 
Though Russia is not the only country guilty of the exploitation of the current state of the 
arctic economy, it stands to become the most important political actor without a change in 
policy. Controlling the largest stretch of territory within the Arctic Circle, Russia has the greatest 
interest in arctic politics. “The ‘High North’ in Russia encompasses more than 60% of Russian 
territory and extends from a land border with Norway to a sea border with the United States” 
(Rowe). With the melting of the icecap, Russia will be more interested in the 1.2 million square 
kilometers of open water newly made available to them (Baev), further spreading the massive 
amount of arctic territory Russia already controls. “Expanding the resource base of Russia’s 
Arctic region so that it can ‘largely satisfy Russia’s needing hydrocarbon resources, water bio 
resources and other types of strategic raw materials’ has been identified as a main objective and 
strategic priority in the Russian Government’s policy in the Arctic to 2020 and beyond” (Rowe). 
Russia’s expanding territorial horizon is mirroring their ambitious foreign policy, an ambition 
that is being well-fed by the melting arctic, filled with new expansion opportunities and 
economic ventures.28  
Under the guise of sovereignty, Russia is making no attempt to hide its interests with 
regards to the newly accessible Arctic territories just outside of their EEZ.29 Russia very clearly 
wants to expand into the Arctic Ocean, they even planted their flag on the seafloor directly 
beneath the North Pole in 2007, demonstrating a level of ambitiousness no other country 
considered to do. However, this area of the ocean is still frozen year round, and not legally under 
the jurisdiction of any country. Simply, Russia is demonstrating to its observers, especially the 
other arctic nations, that it is making the first movements for control over the Arctic Ocean. 
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Because “Russian interests will be critical to its behavior in global politics” (Roi), Russia will 
respond accordingly to better its agenda moving forward. Examining the planting of the Russian 
flag beneath the North Pole is a clear display of Russian intent in the Arctic Ocean. For the other 
arctic nations, the Arctic Council and indeed, the international community of the world, Russian 
movements in the Arctic Circle is a cause for alarm. Russia is pushing into one of the only 
frontier regions left on earth, which left unchecked, could give Russia’s authoritative and 
ambitious government an upper hand. The Arctic Council may be one of the only institutions 
capable of monitoring and legal claims to the prospects of Russia in the coming years.  
One of the ways Russia is rationalizing its expansion into the center of the Arctic Ocean 
is through the Law of the Sea’s Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, which 
permits extensions of EEZs in maritime regions. This would enable Russia to legally exploit 
what could be considered international waters in the center of the Arctic Ocean.30 The 
continental shelf exception allows for legal expansions of the EEZ beyond the 200 nautical mile 
limit if the continental shelf extends beyond the 200 mile line.31 Many Arctic countries can claim 
this exception to extend their EEZ further out to sea, which in an enclosed area like the Arctic 
Ocean will eventually overlap with the maritime territory of another country.32 The extension of 
the economic zone is confirmed or denied only after a petition to extend their EEZ is reviewed 
by a board of geologists and surveyors appointed by the United Nations.33 They are tasked with 
determining if the continental shelf indeed extends beyond the economic zone, and exactly where 
it ends. Their decision is “final and binding” (Kwiatkowska), and determines the boundaries of 
EEZs as recognized by the United Nations.34 However, the Commission for the Limits of the 
Continental Shelf “has no mandate to settle boundary disputes, nor can it make any decisions that 
will bias future resolution to such disputes. Any boundary disagreements must be resolved 
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between the States themselves” (Kwiatkowska).35 This means that when disputes arise between 
two or more countries regarding the use of overlapping maritime territory, there is no moderator 
in the discussion; it is strictly a concern between the two countries, and for many arctic countries, 
ceding any territory to another could be risky. This is where the Arctic Council could step in. In 
an area as conflicting and turbulent as the Arctic Ocean having a middle ground or an unbiased 
party to help to make compromises in situations where both claims are valid could be 
indispensable.36 
Disputes over the territory in the Arctic Circle are not uncommon or unprecedented, one 
of the first major controversies occurred in the early twentieth century. Norway’s Svalbard 
archipelago has been greatly disputed as a valuable Arctic territory.37 In the early 1900’s, the 
Svalbard archipelago, was a highly contested landmass which at the time was not under the 
jurisdiction of any nation. Being well within the Arctic Circle, the archipelago was valued for 
fishing exploits, mining and tourism (Pedersen). After World War I, as part of the postwar peace 
negotiations, it was given to Norway. This gave Norway complete sovereignty over the 
archipelago and its territorial waters. In the 1920’s, the extent of territorial waters was 12 miles. 
As international laws changed, particularly with the enactment of the Law of the Sea, Norway’s 
sovereign control over the mountainous island chain gave Norway much more influence than 
initially intended. New understandings of maritime law dictate that: “The coastal state is not 
required to claim sovereign rights over the continental shelf or to exercise them. Such rights arise 
automatically by operation of international law” (Anderson), therefore, Norway’s assertion of its 
rights regarding Svalbard, under any system of maritime law is valid. Norway’s ownership of the 
Svalbard archipelago is now another base from which Norway can extend its EEZ under the Law 
of the Sea. The Arctic Council was not established at the time of the creation of neither the 
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Svalbard treaty nor the Law of the Sea, and when dispute like the Svalbard dispute arise, the lack 
of dedicated may have contributed to the lackluster decision making.  
The changes in international maritime law were not considered in 1920, and the now 200 
mile EEZ around a geographically separated and sovereign part of Norway is providing great 
benefit. The United States and Russia, who are both signers of the Svalbard decision, reject 
Norway’s claims to an EEZ utilizing Svalbard as an extension point. Their understanding of 
Svalbard as the sovereign territory of Norway is understood through the terms of the Svalbard 
Treaty, up to the original limits of Svalbard’s territorial waters 12 miles offshore.38 “The United 
States fully reserves all rights which it may have under the [Svalbard] Treaty” (Pedersen), 
however, greatly challenges the reservation of a 200 mile economic zone because of newly 
defined laws that ignore the parameters of the original Svalbard decision. Both Russia and the 
United States maintain that the current division of influence in the Arctic is not adequate or 
proper to determine the division of the Arctic Ocean. As demonstrated by the Svalbard dispute, 
the usage of the Law of the Sea as the legal body in the arctic is problematic. Given the 
substantial changes in the area, the Law of the Sea has not demonstrated enough flexibility to 
meet the needs of a terraforming pole.  
The Arctic Circle is a very limited and highly contested area, and as its economic 
viability increases due to ice melt, so too does its volatility; the Arctic nations must make begin 
to work together, or refreeze the icecap. As a valuable resource for international shipping and 
resource extraction, peaceful cooperation and sustainably developing the Arctic will be among 
the greatest challenges facing the circumpolar nations. There is a need for concise and definitive 
policymaking to help equally balance the usage of the Arctic Ocean amongst all of the Arctic 
nations. Simply, there are many problems that need to be solved, and the obvious answer is to 
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implement inter-governmental efforts in the form of the Arctic Council.  The Arctic Council 
Service stands as an already existing, yet powerless body through which the Arctic nations can 
cooperate. Empowerment of the Arctic Council service can help to clarify, off of the already 
standing frameworks of the Law of the Sea, many of the territorial disputes between Arctic 
states. Climate change is still occurring in the Arctic, and these changes will continue to bring 
the politics of the icecap into question. The Arctic Council exists because among all of the arctic 
nations, the mutual interest of a protected and sustainable Arctic was of great importance. For the 
good of the international community and the relations between the eight Arctic nations, it is 
crucial that the Arctic Council be empowered and its decisions enforced to promote cooperation 
in a highly competitive region and avoid international conflict. 
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Endotes 
1 For a map of the Arctic Circle, see appendix A 
2 Many countries are now beginning to see and expand into newly released territory. “At 
issue today is a roughly circular territory around the extreme north that extends beyond this 
perimeter. In 2001, Russia claimed 460,800 square miles of this territory, an area about the size 
of Western Europe” (Gunitskiy). Russia is particularly aggressive here, controlling the most area 
of the Arctic Circle, Russia  
3 ExxonMobil is one of the principal countries striving to set up its oil derricks in the 
Arctic. They are working continuously with Russia, who control most of the Arctic Ocean in 
multi-million dollar operations (Carroll).  However, the risk associated with working in these 
conditions currently is seasonable, and the only way to keep oil drilling in the extreme north 
profitable is if the price of oil is high and consistent. 
4 For a map of an oil survey in the Arctic Circle see appendix B 
5 This is especially true when considering Universitetskaya-1, a “$700 million joint 
exploration project that Rosneft, the Russian state-owned oil company, is developing in the 
Arctic with ExxonMobil” (Carroll). 
6 For a depiction of projected summer ice extents for the twenty-first century, see 
appendix C 
7 The Polar Sea routes are becoming more viable as ice recedes for longer periods of 
time. This is especially true for coastal routes such as the Northwest passage and the Northern 
Sea Route. For a map of the Northwest Passage and other polar sea routes, see appendix D 
 
 Enos 17 
 
 
8 This is a crucial point in understanding the importance of trans-continental trade. For 
hundreds of years, exotic goods from Asia were the greatly sought after in Europe, and shipping 
these things by land would be perilous journeys in excess of many months. By sea, it was more 
likely to reach port in similar amounts of time. In fact, the colonization of the new world was 
brought about by the desire for faster shipping lanes to Asia from Europe, when Columbus 
crossed the Atlantic he was searching for India. “Since European colonization of North America 
began, explorers have sought a usable route around the northern coast of North America” (Kim).  
However, “Using the Northwest Passage had previously been considered commercially 
impractical due to multi-year pack ice that rendered navigation hazardous or impossible” now 
that pack ice is receding, navigating this passage will save many ships nearly 4,000 miles as 
opposed to the Panama Canal. 
9 This Area not only represents a potentially lucrative shipping highway for international 
ships, but also a fragile and valuable economic zone for the countries who hold the territory. 
Therefore, Canada, The United States, Denmark and Russia may be more reluctant to allow 
foreign ships into their economic zones for the sake of shipping efficiency.  
10 Articles 57, 58 and 59 of the Law of the Sea are the most significant for determining 
the responsibility of arctic states in their EEZs. For the Charter regarding Exclusive Economic 
Zones for the United Nations Convention for the Law of the Sea, see appendix E. 
11 Article 25, of Section II of the Law of the Sea defers all authority to the nation whose 
exclusive economic zone was infringed for the defense and actions against intrusive actions from 
other nations. This means that if another country were to infringe upon the boundaries of the 
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exclusive economic zone of a particular country, they are authorized by the Law of the Sea to 
defend it, through any means necessary.  
12 For the Articles pertaining to Enclosed Seas under the Law of the Sea, see appendix F. 
13 Article 123 is in place “to create a level playing field and regional uniformity”, and 
maintain that international waters are shared, above all else, despite the “vacuum” state that 
enclosed waters exist in (Preamble). 
14 This exception specifically regards access to waters when considering dangerous ice or 
wildlife refuges prone to damage done by ships. In these instances, for the safety of the local 
emergency response teams and international sailors, The Law of the Sea gives authority to the 
most proximate nation, who is responsible for search and rescue. Prevention is key here, because 
if deemed too dangerous by the rescuing nation, or vulnerable it is their duty to make resolve the 
issue.  
15  The Law of the Sea, which is currently considered the governing document for the 
Arctic Ocean, is not universally agreed upon by all of the Arctic nations.  
16 Non-Arctic countries are not excluded from the Arctic Council; these countries are 
categorized by the member states as “primary participants” and “observing nations” (Arctic 
Council). Primary participant nations are countries such as the United Kingdoms, France and 
Germany, and observer nations are countries such as India and China. The distinction here is 
made by the Arctic council. Permanent participants are the political structures of indigenous 
people who are non-affiliated with countries, who are considered members of the Council, 
though not as heavily weighted. Observers are strictly so, invited to sit in on the bi–annual 
meetings of the council; they are not permitted to vote on changes to the system. Some observers 
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(China, India) are considered “ad-hoc”, and must request permission to attend summits. Observer 
nations are non-arctic nations with interest in the motions being carried regarding arctic policies. 
Countries with significant interest in utilizing the arctic territory for scientific exploration or 
shipping would apply to become an observer. For the 1996 Ottawa Declaration, See Appendix G. 
17 The member states as recognized by the Arctic Council are: Canada, The United States, 
Russia, Norway, Denmark, Sweden, Finland, Iceland and any group of native people who is 
established in the Arctic Circle. 
18 The Arctic Council works for as long as the member nations are compliant with its 
charter. If one of the goals of the Arctic council is to prevent destruction of the environment and 
a member nation were to be observed in violating this, the forum would intervene at one of the 
bi-annual summits requesting the cease of destructive actions. Refusal to do so may result in the 
omission of council funding for various Arctic affairs in that country. Beyond this, the Arctic 
Council cannot prevent in any tangible way violations of its sanctions.  
19 Additionally, the Arctic Council distributes funding to the member nations for various 
endeavors, such as scientific studies. These funds are collected by contributions from the 
member states and donations made by observers and participants of the Arctic Council. These 
funds help to incentivize the Arctic nations to promote growth within the Arctic Circle, but in a 
cooperative and orderly manner. The funds are distributed frequently for scientific research and 
cultural enrichment programs for those with native ancestry.  
20 Obviously, an ice-free pole will also represent greatly risen ocean levels, which could 
pose additional hazards directly to arctic states and indeed, the rest of the world’s coastlines. 
Regardless of the negative impacts of climate change, the Arctic will still represent a new 
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frontier for the countries here. Freed from permafrost, new cities and towns may be built along 
the northern coasts, and there may be a great surge in development and agriculture during the 
months when it is available. Such changes could have interesting impacts on the global economy. 
What is foreseeable is that fossil fuels will not be losing importance, and will become available 
sooner than other effects of climate change. 
21 The Arctic Council Service however, is mutually agreed upon by all eight polar states, 
and strictly concerns itself with arctic affairs, including maritime safety, but also with 
considerations for environmental protection, resource management and international cooperation 
Despite this, because it was not designed to fit the purposes of international enforcement of the 
predominantly frozen Arctic Ocean in 1996, it is dramatically ill-equipped to manage the 
disputes becoming more prevalent with the significant recession of seasonal ice sheets today. 
This leaves a considerable gap in the political management of this area. 
22 This essentially makes the United States invulnerable to infringements of the Law of 
the Sea. This disagreement is a strong foundation for the disagreements in the Arctic Ocean. 
23 Many world powers have had military presence in the Arctic Circle for decades. 
Military presence, whether for exercises, bases or surveillance has become a norm in the Arctic 
Circle.  
24 Because of the individual interest of each arctic states, another international 
organization is needed to portion out the territories. The default organization for the moderation 
of the Arctic is currently the United Nations, and its Convention for the Law of the Sea (The 
Law of the Sea, or UNCLOS). The Law of the Sea is currently considered to be the only legal 
body for the Arctic Ocean; the most agreed upon set of international laws regarding maritime 
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conflicts is the Law of the Sea. For the purposes of the Arctic Ocean, the articles regarding 
territorial and international waters are the most significant.  
25 Though it is not likely that an empowered Arctic Council could entirely prevent 
military action from its members, it nevertheless separates itself entirely from the militaristic 
actions of its members, deferring all authority to the United Nations and its commissions, 
removing all possibility of preventative measures.  
26 Arctic Fishing is one of the largest commercial fishing industries. Particularly with 
King Crab, Cod and Salmon. These fisheries are only becoming more exploitable with the 
recession of polar ice. “As Arctic sea ice recedes due to climate change, there is increasing 
interest in commercial fishing in Arctic waters”. The Bering fishing region is often referred to as 
America’s “fish basket," with about “60 percent of U.S. commercial landings, according to the 
state fishing industry” (Winter). The Sustainability of the fishing industry is of great concern 
when considering environmental change, because the climate and the industry are directly linked. 
As an explanation of the financial importance of the Arctic, it is becoming more apparent, at 
least to the US government, that the climate change is having impacts on the industry. For a Map 
of the current fisheries and economic regions of the Arctic, see appendix I. 
27 ”the Arctic produces about 1/10 of the world’s crude oil and a quarter of its gas. Of 
this, 80 percent of the oil and 99 percent of the gas come from Russia” (Rowe). As it stands, 
Russia’s control of the Oil market is sizeable, but when one considers the potential increase that 
could be seized from an expedition in the Arctic Ocean Russia can be definitively poised as a 
global superpower.  
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28 Russia’s interest in the Arctic has always been profound, especially in the early 1900’s, 
where the coastal Arctic waterways were crucial for shipping from eastern Russia to Moscow. 
During the Second World War, these arctic coastlines, particularly in the North Sea, proved to be 
a weakness for Russia. Many of Russia’s wartime supplies were shipped to their major cities in 
this region; easy targets for German U-boats. “U-boats claimed to have sunk eleven or twelve 
merchant ships totaling 42,000 gross registered tons, one destroyer, five escort vessels, a tug, and 
some barges, and to have bombarded a number of shore stations and laid a great many mines” 
(Armstrong 100). Such losses were numerous throughout the war, and Russia’s troops and cities 
were continuously starved as a result. World War II demonstrated to the Russians that they 
weren’t the only ones who occupied the north, and that they risked a great deal by sending 
supplies via this route. Russia was punished by Germany for investing so heavily into the 
Arctic’s sea lanes. With the arctic being so massive, and constituting so much to the Russian 
economy and national security,28 a strong presence within the Arctic is not only beneficial, but 
necessary to maintain Russian interests in the Arctic Circle. The Arctic is not only a great asset 
for Russia, but as demonstrated by the Germans, a great weakness.   
29 The attitude of the Russian Federation we see today stems from a rebirth the Soviet 
mentality, which is now guiding modern advances into the arctic.  They wanted to portray 
strength at all times. The USSR would release statements such as: “annual freight turnover had 
increased fourfold since 1940” (Armstrong 104),  a clear attempt to intimidate other countries 
through economic superiority because of the Arctic. This information was so secretive, that when 
entering ports, it was said that the Soviet ships would confiscate binoculars and cameras from 
anyone in the port to prevent any possible espionage (Armstrong 103). The majority of the 
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shipping done here was timber, which at the time was the largest industry in the northern sector 
of Russia, and moving the Timber from Siberia to Europe was only facilitated by the northern 
sea route. As a result of the rebirth of this mentality Russia’s international cooperation has 
changed, so much so, that it could be described as: “haphazard and focused primarily on 
emergency measures” (Rowe). With Regards to the Arctic, Russia is still propagating its Soviet-
era agenda of economic gains in a highly competitive way. If this behavior continues, the 
political environment of the arctic will be put under even more stress.  
30 Universally, 200 nautical miles from the coastline of a nation is considered the 
exclusive economic zone, regardless if the continental shelf extends that far offshore. This 
remains true until the continental shelf begins to slope into deep water. From the end of the 
Continental shelf, the exclusive economic zone is further extended sixty nautical miles from the 
drop-off point. 
31 This is defined by Article 76, sections 4-7 of the United Nations Convention of the 
Law of the Sea. For the articles of the Law of the Sea regarding the definition of the Continental 
Shelf, see appendix J. 
32 Russia is particularly interested in the use of this exception, claiming the Losmonov 
Ridge, which crosses the middle of the Arctic Ocean as an extension of its Continental shelf. “By 
law, states that have ratified UNCLOS can petition a special UN commission, the Commission 
on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS), to extend their economic zone—but only if they 
can demonstrate that the area in question is connected to their own continental shelf. Russia's 
delegation argued that its continental shelf is connected to the North Pole via the 1,100-mile 
Losmonov Ridge, which bisects the Arctic Ocean, stretching between Siberia and Canada's 
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Ellesmere Island” (Gunitskiy). This claim would give Russia a large area in the center of the 
Ocean as its exclusive economic property. For a map of the Continental Shelves within the 
Arctic Circle, see appendix K. 
33 They do this by determining where the points of measurement are, and when 
geographically, the changes in the shelf are significant enough to determine that it has ended, and 
is becoming Open Ocean. There are many determining factors here. Including seafloor soil 
composition, ocean depth, and the type of rocks on the seafloor and also depth-gradient and 
nearest neighbor determinations.  
34 Russia’s particular utilization of this legal exception as a justification for expansion 
into the center of the Arctic Ocean is troublesome. While Russia’s claim is currently under 
review by the Commission for the Limits of the Continental Shelf, if Russia’s claim was found to 
be valid via the Losmonov ridge, Russia will be legally enabled to have control over much of the 
middle of the Arctic Ocean. 
35 “Because of its fundamental duty not to prejudice any disputes, or other matters, 
concerning maritime boundaries and related issues, consideration by the CLCS of the 
preliminary Submissions by coastal states (and Notes Verbales by other states concerned) on the 
limits of their outer CS (OCS) beyond 200 nautical miles (nm) provide a useful stimulus for the 
resolution of these disputes” (Kwiatkowska). The mandate of the Commission for the Limits of 
the Continental Shelf is to avoid prejudices and make decisions based on the validity of motion 
for extension. Regardless of intent, the CLCS is not working for or against any party.  
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36 Please refer to appendix H for the current divisions of maritime territory, and Appendix 
K for a map of the continental shelves. Comparing these two maps will show how the divisions 
of polar territory is influenced by the continental shelf exception.  
37 For a map of the Svalbard Archipelago see appendix L. 
38 “If interpreted literally, the Svalbard Treaty does not apply to areas beyond the 
territorial sea, currently drawn by Norway as being 12 nautical miles from the baselines of 
Svalbard. Norway takes this view and thus maintains that it has exclusive rights under the 1982 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOS Convention) to exploit the resources 
beyond the territorial sea of Svalbard” (Pedersen) 
